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A B S T R A C T 
The Westinghouse AP1000® reactor is an advanced design whose safety systems are mainly passive 
safety systems. Due to the passive nature of the safety related systems and its dependency on small 
changes on certain variables (e.g. pressure, friction coefficients) together with the use ofa simplified code 
like MAAP in Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) analyses, it makes necessary to confirm that when core 
cooling is achieved, thermal-hydraulic (T/H) uncertainties are bounded. The T/H uncertainty evaluation 
process performed by Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC) identified the low-margin sequences ( core 
uncovery) by expanding PRA Event Trees (ETs). The expanded ETs allowed finding the low-margin risk-
important sequences and then a set of low-margin bounding sequences was selected. Then detailed 
safety analysis methodologies were applied in order to evaluate the bounding sequences demonstrating 
that the T/H uncertainties were bounded. The Universidad Politécnica de Madrid group has verified the 
low-margin bounding sequences obtained by WEC with the best-estimate TRACE code in order to verify 
the previous results and also to study the phenomenology of such sequences through a best-estimate 
code. This paper presents the results obtained for short-term low-margin bounding sequences. In general, 
TRACE results do not present important discrepancies with respect to NOTRUMP and WCOBRA/TRAC 
results although TRACE presents lower values for Peak Cladding Temperature. This analysis has allowed 
to verify the AP1000 thermal-hydraulic bounding evaluation process performed by WEC for the low-
margin risk-important sequences with TRACE code. 
1. Introduction 
The success criteria justification in the AP1000 Probabilistic 
Risk Assessment (PRA) was addressed, in part, through the analysis 
performed in the Oeterministic Safety Analysis (OSA) as part of the 
Oesign Control Oocument (OCO) (Westinghouse Electric Company, 
2008) but in sequences which involved Automatic Oepressuriza-
tion System (AOS) actuation, (e.g. small break LOCA) the OSA 
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Thermal-Hydraulic (T/H) analysis was not applicable due to the 
assumption of single failure in such analyses. This fact leads to 
the performance of a large number of simulations due to the mul-
tiple combinations between events and failure combinations. 
These analyses are only feasible if fast computer codes are used. 
Therefore, MAAP4 code (MAAP4, 1994) was selected far this pur-
pose, see (Westinghouse Electric Company, 2003b). This issue 
was a licensing problem since the NRC required a more detailed 
analysis in arder to bound the potential T/H uncertainties associ-
ated to the use of best-estimate parameter val u es ( e.g. residual 
heat) and the limited details and simplified TH models included 
in MAAP code (Selim Sancaktar and Terry Schulz, 2004). 
In arder to cope with this issue, Westinghouse Electric Com-
pany (WEC) developed an approach to bound the T/H uncertainty 
in the APGOO PRA success criteria analysis which was also applied 
to the AP1000, see references (Selim Sancaktar and Terry Schulz, 
2004; Ohkawa et al., 1997; Westinghouse Electric Company, 
2003a; Advisory Committee on Reactor safeguards 
subcommittees on Reliability and probabilistic Risk Assessment, 
2003 ). This approach must demonstrate that the low margin 
sequences (core uncovery sequences) which have been considered 
as success sequences in PRA are bounded by T/H uncertainties. 
The methodology developed by WEC identified the low-margin 
sequences by expanding PRA Event Trees (ET). The expanded ETs 
allowed to find the low-margin risk-important sequences and then 
a set of low-margin bounding sequences was selected. Then 
detailed safety analysis methodologies were applied in arder to 
evaluate the bounding sequences. Severa! OSA methodologies cor-
responding to different options of the IAEA Specific Safety Guide 
SSG-2, see Table 1 and (IAEA, 2009), were applied by WEC to eval-
uate each low-margin bounding sequence. 
The main goal ofthis work is to reproduce and verify the whole 
bounding process proposed by WEC including the simulation of ali 
short-term low-margin bounding sequences applying the SSG-2 
option 2 methodology. 
This work has been developed in the frame of the "Integrated 
Safety Analysis Methodology Applied to Advanced Reactors 
(ISAMAR)" project. The ISAMAR project includes severa! OSA and 
PRA verifications like LBLOCA-BEPU (OSA), SBLOCA (OSA), Oirect 
Vessel Injection Line Break (OVILB) ET delineation (PRA) and avail-
able time in OVILB sequences, see (Montero-Mayorga et al., 2015, 
2014; Quera! et al., 2015; Quera! and Montero-Mayorga, 2016). 
In the seque!, Section 2 presents the AP1000 passive safety sys-
tems. Section 3 provides a description of low-margin sequences 
evaluation process. Section 4 gives an overview about LOCA 
sequences in the AP1000 reactor and the AP1000 TRACE model 
nodalization is presented in Section 5. The analysis of low-
margin bounding sequences as well as main results obtained is 
presented in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 collects the main conclu-
sions of this paper. 
2. AP1000 passive safety systems 
Basically, the same configuration of typical PWRs safety sys-
tems is used far AP1000, one system far high pressure safety injec-
tion (CMTs), one system far medium pressure safety injection 
(accumulators) and one system far low pressure safety injection 
(IRWST). However, these systems are significantly simpler than 
typical PWR safety systems since they contain significantly fewer 
components. In addition a new system far passive core cooling is 
implemented (PRHR) as well as one system far AOS. Figs. 1 and 2 
show a schematic view of AP1000 reactor and the main systems. 
The AP1000 passive safety systems are briefly described below 
(Westinghouse Electric Company, 2008): 
• Core Makeup Tan/(5 (CMTs). There are two CMTs as part of the 
passive safety system in AP1000. These tanks are cylindrical 
with an hemispherical upper and lower head. The CMTs are 
located above the Oirect Vessel Injection (OVI), Fig. 1, and they 
are filled with cold (c"320 K) borated water at the Reactor Cool-
ant System (RCS) pressure. Each tank (70.8 m3 ) is connected to 
one cold leg of the same loop from the upper part and to the OVI 
Table 1 
Options for DSA methodologies, IAEA Specific Safety Guide SSG-2, (IAEA, 2009). 
Option Computer Availability of systems Initial and boundary 
code conditions 
Conservative Conservative assumptions Conservative input 
data 
2 BE Conservative assumptions Conservative input 
data 
3 BE Conservative assumptions Realistic input data 
with uncertainties 
4 BE Probabilistic safety Realistic input data 
analysis based with uncertainties 
assumptions 
from the lower part. In normal operation the balance line (con-
nection from the RCS to the upper part of the CMT) is normally 
open. However, the discharge of the CMTs is isolated upan 
receipt a safeguards signa! S. In case of demand, the CMTs can 
operate in two different ways, injection and recirculation 
modes. 
• Accumulators (ACCs). As in a standard PWR the AP1000 includes 
ACCs as well. There are 2 spherical ACCs (57 m3 each) located 
just below the CMTs and are filled with borated water 
(c"320 K) and pressurized with nitrogen ( 49 bar). Like the CMTs, 
the ACCs are connected to the OVI lines. In normal operation the 
ACCs are isolated by check valves. If the RCS pressure falls 
below the ACCs pressure, the check valves open. The ACCs are 
necessary in arder to reflood the core in case of LOCA providing 
borated water at high flow. 
• In Contaínment Refuelíng Water Storage Tank (IRWST). The IRWST 
is a large tank (2070 m3 ) located inside the containment and 
above the RCS. Two lines connect the lower part of the IRWST 
with both OVI lines. The borated water (c"320 K) inside the 
IRWST will drain by gravity into the RCS when the pressure is 
clase to the containment pressure. 
• Passíve Residual Heat Removal System (PRHR). The passive core 
cooling system includes a PRHR heat exchanger located inside 
the IRWST. The inlet of the system is connected to one of the 
hot legs at and the outlet is connected to the corresponding 
steam generator water box. The IRWST provides the heat sink 
far the PRHR with a water volume sufficient to absorb decay 
heat far more than one hour befare the water begins to boíl. 
• Automatíc Depressurízatíon System (ADS). The AOS consists of 
faur valves stages. It can be differentiated between the three 
first stages and the faurth one. Stages 1 /2/3 (AOS-1 /2/3) consist 
of two lines each. Such lines are included as part of the PZR 
safety and relief valve module being connected to the top of 
the PZR. The discharge of these valves is located inside the 
IRWST. On the other hand, stage-4 (AOS-4) has faur lines con-
nected to the hot legs which discharges directly to the contain-
ment. The whole system accounts far a total of 20 valves: AOS-1 
is composed by 4-inch motor-operated valves, AOS-2/3 are 8-
inch motor-operated valves and AOS-4 is composed by 14-
inch squib valves. 
3. Low-margin sequences evaluation process 
This section describes the methodology fallowed by WEC to 
identify low-margin sequences (sequences with core uncovery) 
and thereafter, how such sequences are evaluated. This process 
must demonstrate that the low margin sequences which have 
been considered as success sequences in PRA are bounded by 
T/H uncertainties. For this purpose, low-margin risk-important 
sequences must be determined and verified by means of ther-
mal hydraulic analysis. The main steps of the WEC methodology 
are the fallowing (Westinghouse Electric Company, 2003a), 
Fig. 3: 
1. To delineate the Focused PRA (Selim Sancaktar and Terry 
Schulz, 2004). The Focused PRA is a sensitivity study of the 
AP1000 PRA which does not include active systems like the 
Normal Residual Heat Removal System far accident mitigation. 
2. To expand the ETs of the Focused PRA. The expanded event 
trees (EET) include ali the possible systems configuration and 
not only success criteria configurations are considered. For 
instance, the CMTs actuation possibilities in the standard ET 
are 1 out of2 (success criteria) or zero, while in the EET the pos-
sibility of 2 out of 2 CMT actuation is also taken into account. 
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3. Once the expansion of the ET has been completed, the success 
sequen ces are binned into two categories: 
• OK category which contains success sequences in which the 
core remains covered during the whole transient 
• UC category which contains success sequences in which sorne 
core uncovery is detected (low-margin sequences). 
4. The low-margin sequences are conservatively considered to 
lead to core damage in arder to allow quantification of their 
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Fig. 3. Low-Margin Sequences Evaluation Process. 
risk importance and are collected and ranked by their poten-
tial contributions to Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large 
Release Frequency (LRF), as shown in Table 2 (only the first 
25 sequences have been collected far this paper from 
(Westinghouse Electric Company, 2003a), DFi sequences). 
5. Only those sequences which can potentially contribute to the 
CDF or LRF with more than 1% of the base CDF or LRF are con-
sidered as low-margin risk-important sequences (LMi 
sequences), being the base CDF and LRF 2.41E-07/year and 
Table 2 
1.95E-08/year, respectively (Westinghouse Electric Company, 
2003b). WEC identified thirteen low-margin risk-important 
sequences which are gathered in Table 3. It is important to 
remark that ali these sequences correspond to different kinds 
of LOCA sequences. These low-margin risk-important 
sequences have the following characteristics in common 
(Westinghouse Electric Company, 2003a): 4 out of 4 ADS-4 
valves and severa! of ADS-2/3 valves available; Six sequences 
have one tank (CMT or ACC) available; the remaining sequences 
PRA low-margin sequences sorted by potential CDF and LRF (DFi sequences) (Westinghouse Electric Company, 2003a). 
DFi Initiating Sequence Sequen ce Percentage Percentage IRWST Bounding CI & CMT ACC ADS-4 ADS-2/3 Sequen ce Event CDF LRF CDF LRF RECIRC Sequen ces 
DFl DVILB 8.96E-07 5.37E-08 371.66 275.6 Yes Yes 1 o 4 2-4 BS-C 
DF2 SADS 4.58E-07 2.75E-08 190.05 140.93 Yes Yes 2 1 4 2-4 BS-E 
DF3 DVILB 3.05E-07 1.83E-08 126.76 94 Yes Yes o 1 4 2-4 BS-A 
DF4 MBLOCA 2.89E-07 1.73E-08 119.85 88.88 Yes Yes o 2 4 2-4 BS-A, BS-B 
DF5 CMT 1.34E-07 8.05E-09 55.67 41.28 Yes Yes o 2 4 2-4 BS-A, BS-B 
DF6 SADS 9.12E-08 5.47E-09 37.82 28.05 No Yes 2 2 4 2-4 BS-E 
DF7 MBLOCA 3.0lE-08 1.81E-09 12.48 9.26 Yes Yes 2 o 4 2-4 BS-C 
DF8 LB LOCA 8.51E-09 8,SIE-09 3.53 43.63 No Yes 2 2 4 2-4 BS-D 
DF9 CMT 6.42E-09 3.85E-10 2.67 1.98 Yes Yes 1 o 4 2-4 BS-C 
DFlO MBLOCA 2.44E-09 1.47E-10 1.01 0.75 Yes Yes o 1 4 2-4 BS-A 
DFll DVILB 2.09E-09 1.25E-10 0.87 0.64 Yes Yes 1 o 3 2-4 BS-C 
DF12 DVILB 1.64E-09 9.83E-10 0.68 0.5 Yes Yes 1 o 4 0-1 BS-C 
DF13 DVILB 1.52E-09 1.52E-09 0.63 7.77 No Yes 1 o 4 2-4 BS-C 
DF14 CMT 1.14E-09 6.85E-11 0.47 0.35 Yes Yes o 1 4 2-4 BS-A 
DF15 SADS 1.07E-09 6.42E-11 0.44 0.33 Yes Yes 2 1 3 2-4 
DF16 SADS 8.40E-10 5.04E-11 0.35 0.26 Yes Yes 2 1 4 0-1 BS-E 
DF17 SADS 7.77E-10 4.66E-11 0.32 0.24 No Yes 2 1 4 2-4 BS-E 
DF18 DVILB 7.21E-10 4.32E-11 0.3 0.22 Yes Yes o 1 3 2-4 
DF19 MBLOCA 6.92E-10 4.15E-11 0.29 0.21 Yes Yes o 2 3 2-4 
DF20 SADS 6.76E-10 4,05E-11 0.28 0.21 Yes Yes 1 1 4 2-4 BS-E 
DF21 MBLOCA 6.44E-10 3.86E-11 0.27 0.2 Yes Yes o 2 4 0-1 BS-A, BS-B 
DF22 DVILB 6.15E-10 3.69E-11 0.26 0.19 Yes Yes o 1 4 0-1 BS-A 
DF23 DVILB 5.16E-10 5.16E-10 0.21 2.65 No Yes o 1 4 2-4 BS-A 
DF24 MBLOCA 4.88E-10 4.88E-10 0.2 2.5 No Yes o 2 4 2-4 BS-A 
DF25 CMT 3.17E-10 1.90E-11 0.13 0.1 Yes Yes o 2 3 2-4 
Table 3 
PRA low-margin risk-important sequences (LMi) (Westinghouse Electric Company, 2003a). 
IRWST LMi Initiating ADS- Bounding CI & CMT ACC ADS-2/3 PRHR CDF LRF %CDF %LRF Sequence event 4 Sequence RECIRC 
LMl DVILB Yes Yes 1 o 4 
LM2 SADS Yes Yes 2 1 4 
LM3 DVILB Yes Yes o 1 4 
LM4 MBLOCA Yes Yes o 2 4 
LM5 CMT Yes Yes o 2 4 
LM6 SADS No Yes 2 2 4 
LM7 MBLOCA Yes Yes 2 o 4 
LM8 LB LOCA No Yes 2 2 4 
LM9 CMT Yes Yes 1 o 4 
LMlO MBLOCA Yes Yes o 1 4 
LMll DVILB No Yes 1 o 4 
LM12 DVILB No Yes o 1 4 
LM13 MBLOCA No Yes o 2 4 
have two to faur tanks (both ACCs and CMTs) available, The 
sequences without CMTs have the PRHR available (PRA success 
criteria). 
6. Subsequently, five short-term and two long-term bounding 
sequen ces (BS-k) were selected by WEC to be analysed to bound 
the risk-important low-margin sequences, as shown in Table 4. 
None BS-k sequence includes AOS-2/3 actuation in arder to 
bound LMi sequences. 
7. The final step of the WEC methodology is to evaluate such 
bounding sequences by using OSA methodologies, Table 1, 
and the corresponding WEC T/H codes (NOTRUMP/LOCTA 
Meyer, 1985 and (Shimeck and Hartz, 2000), WCOBRA/TRAC 
(Hochreiter et al., 1998) to show if adequate core cooling is 
achieved and therefare T/H uncertainties are bounded 
(Westinghouse Electric Company, 1997). 
With respect to the OSA methodologies, it must be pointed out 
that, WEC fallows SSG-2 option 3 methodology far bounding 
sequences BS-0 and BS-E and SSG-2 option 1 methodology far 
the other bounding sequences, see (IAEA, 2009) far more details. 
The results obtained by WEC (last column in Table 4) show that 
are severa! short-term and long-term bounding sequences with 
Table 4 
2-4 NIA 8.96E-07 5.37E-08 317.7 275.6 BS-C 
2-4 NIA 4.58E-07 2.75E-08 190.1 140.9 BS-E 
2-4 Yes 3.05E-07 l.83E-08 126.8 94 BS-A 
2-4 Yes 2.89E-07 1.73E-08 119.9 88.9 BS-B 
2-4 Yes 1.34E-07 8.05E-09 55.7 41.3 BS-B 
2-4 NIA 9.12E-08 5.47E-09 37.8 28 BS-E 
2-4 NIA 3.0IE-08 l.81E-09 12.5 9.3 BS-C 
2-4 NIA 8.51E-09 8.51E-09 3.5 43.6 BS-D 
2-4 NIA 6.42E-09 3.85E-10 2.7 2 BS-C 
2-4 Yes 2.44E-09 l.47E-10 1,0 0.8 BS-A 
2-4 NIA 1.52E-09 l.52E-09 0.6 7.8 BS-C 
2-4 Yes 5.16E-10 5.16E-10 0.2 2.6 BS-A 
2-4 Yes 4.88E-10 4.88E-10 0.2 2.5 BS-A 
Total~ 2.22E-06 l.44E-07 
core uncovery in MAAP simulations which did not present core 
uncovery with NOTRUMP. 
The UPM group has reproduced the whole process far ali the ETs 
proposed by WEC far potential expansion (Westinghouse Electric 
Company, 2003a): Medium break LOCA (MBLOCA), CMT line break 
(CMT), OVILB, LBLOCA and Spurious actuation of AOS (SAOS). The 
first three ETs correspond to medium LOCA trees (2 in.<O < 9 in.) 
and the last two ETs correspond to large LOCA. With this aim, 
the so called SSG-2 option 2 (IAEA, 2009) has been used to verify 
the low-margin bounding sequences, which includes the use of a 
best-estimate computer code (TRACE) US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, 2007. However, conservative initial conditions and 
assumptions are still used. 
As an example, Figs. 4 and 5 show the ET expansion process far 
the OVILB initiating event reproduced by UPM. Furthermore, only 
sequences with successful injection of IRWST are considered since 
IRWST failure sequences are core damage sequences. Once the ETs 
have been expanded, different kind of sequences can be identified 
within them, Fig. 5: 
• Sequences coming from the conventional ET (OTn). 
• Sequences which confarm the complete EET (OXm). 
• Low-margin sequences with potential contribution to COF or 
LRF, Table 2 (OFi). 
Low-margin bounding sequences identified by WEC (BS-k) (Westinghouse Electric Company, 2003a). 
Bounding IRWST& PRHR BoundsLMi PCT (K). Initiating event CI CMT ACC ADS-4 NOTRUMPor 
sequence RECIRC Sequences WCOBRA/TRAC 
Short-term Cooling 
BS-A Hot leg break (3.0 in.) No Yes o 1 4 Yes 3,10,12,13 670 (N) 
BS-B Double-ended CMT Yes Yes o 2 4 Yes 4,5 No core uncovery balance line (6.8 in.) (N) 
BS-C Double-ended DVI No Yes 1 o 3 No 1,7,9,11 1127 (N) line ( 4 in.) 
BS-D Double-ended cold-leg No Yes 2 2 4 Yes 8 1286 (WC/T) LBLOCA (2x22in) 
BS-E Spurious ADS-4 ( 4x 11 No Yes 1 1 4 Yes 2,6 845 (WC/T) in.) 
Long-term Cooling 
BS-F Double-ended DVI Yes l/1&111 1 o 3 No 1-5,7,9,10 No core uncovery line ( 4 in.) (N) 
BS-G Double-ended DVI No l/1&111 1 o 4 No 6,8,11-13 No core uncovery line ( 4 in.) (N) 
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• Sequences that were classified as low-margin risk-important 
sequences, Table 3 (LMi). 
• Sequences that correspond to the low-margin bounding 
sequences, Table 4 (BS-k). 
The corresponding DFi, LMi, and BS-k sequences associated to 
each EET are shown in Table 5. In addition, this table shows the fre-
quency contribution to potential CDF in each EET. The comparison 
of poten tia! CDF of these LMi sequen ces with respect to PRA Leve! 1 
Table 5 
Important sequences associated to each EET for potential CDF. 
Initiating event DFi 
DVILB DFl, DF3, DFl 1, DF12, DF13, DF18, DF22, DF23 
SPADS DF2, DF6, DF15 DF16 DFl 7 DF20 
MBLOCA DF4,DF7,DF10,DF24 
CMTLB DF5,DF9,DF14,DF25 
LB LOCA DF8 
CDF, Table 3 and Table 5, indicates that many of these sequences 
could potentially increase the AP1000 CDF, therefare it is neces-
sary to verify these sequences adequately. 
4. AP1000 LOCA sequences overview 
This section is intended to describe the behavior of the AP1000 
reactor in case of LOCA sequences since ali the low-margin 
sequences, that will be analysed thereafter, are different kinds of 
LOCA sequences (namely being BS-A, BS-B and BS-C MBLOCAs, 
and BS-D and BS-E LBLOCAs). In the fallowing, a brief explanation 
about the phenomenology in case of MBLOCA and LBLOCA will be 
given. 
As in a typical PWR, during a MBLOCA the RCS depressurizes 
rapidly. When the pressure drops to the reactor-trip setpoint 
(124 bar) the control rods are inserted, thus stopping the chain 
reaction. Subsequently, the RCS pressure decrease to the safety-
injection signa! setpoint (117 bar) aligning the passive core cooling 
system, namely CMTs, ACCs, IRWST and operation of PRHR and 
automatically tripping the Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs). The 
main BE setpoints far LOCA sequences are collected in Table 6. Four 
different phases can be identified in the AP1000 reactor during 
MBLOCA sequences, see references (Lafi and Reyes, 1999; Friend 
et al., 1997; Wright, 2007; Montero-Mayorga et al., 2015) far more 
details: 
• Blowdown. The Blowdown phase corresponds to the initial pres-
sure decreasing where the reactor trip and S signa! are 
triggered. 
• Natural círculatíon. Natural circulation phase is the period in 
which, after the trip of the RCPs, the RCS is cooled by natural cir-
culation paths. When the valves of the CMTs and PRHR open, 
three additional natural circulation paths are established pro-
viding core cooling leading the RCS pressure to values below 
of SG pressure (Montero-Mayorga et al., 2015). This period ends 
Table 6 
Main setpoints for LOCA sequences (Westinghouse Electric Company, 2008) (BE 
values). 
System 
Reactor SCRAM 
S signa! 
CMT injection 
SG main FW valves start to clase 
RCP trip 
PRHR alignment 
ACC injection 
ADS-1 
ADS-2 
ADS-3 
ADS-4 
IRWST squib valves open 
Setpoint 
124 bar 
117 bar 
S signa!+ 2 second delay 
S signa!+ 5 second delay 
S signa!+ 6 second delay 
S signa! 
49 bar 
CMT low leve! (67.5%) 
48 second after ADS-1 
120 second after ADS-2 
128 second after ADS-3 & 
CMT low-low (20%) 
ADS-4 actuation 
LMi LMi CDF ( contribution%) BS-k 
LMl, LM3, LM11, LM12 1.20E-6 BS-C, BS-F, 
(445.3%) BS-G 
LM2, LM6 5.5E-7 BS-E 
(227.9%) 
LM4, LM7, LM10, LM13 3.22E-7 BS-A 
(133.6%) 
LM5, LM9 1.40E-7 BS-B 
LM8 
(58.4%) 
8.52E-9 BS-D 
(3.5%) 
with ADS-1 actuation. Unlike typical PWRs the steam 
generators are not as important during MBLOCAs in AP1000 
since the PRHR is activated very early in the accident and the 
IRWST serves as primary heat sink (Montero-Mayorga et al., 
2015). The CMTs remain in recirculation mode and steam starts 
to replace water at the top ofthe tanks until the leve! in at least 
one CMT reaches about the 67.5% leve! and the ADS actuation 
signa! is activated. 
• ADS blowdown. Once 1 out of 2 CMTs leve! is about 67.5% the 
ADS-1 valves open automatically, at this time the ADS blow-
down phase starts. After a short delay, ADS-2/3 actuate. When 
at least one CMT reaches about 20% leve!, the ADS-4 valves 
open. Thanks to the pressure reduction through the ADS valves 
as well as through the break, the setpoint far ACC actuation is 
reached ( 49 bar). This fact makes possible that the borated 
water contained in the ACCs drains into the RCS. ACCs injection 
stops partía! or totally the flow from the CMTs due to the larger 
ACCs flow through the DVIs. 
• IRWST ínjectíon. The short-term cooling ends with the IRWST 
injection phase. The actuation of the ADS-4 helps to reduce 
the RCS pressure near to containment pressure allowing the 
injection ofborated water from the IRWST by gravity. After that, 
long-term cooling far MBLOCA is established. 
In case of LBLOCA or spurious ADS-4 actuation the RCS depres-
surizes very fast to atmospheric conditions and the ADS-1 /2/3 are 
not necessary to allow ACCs injection. This kind of scenario pre-
sents the fallowing phases (Quera! et al., 2015): 
• Blowdown. Two sub-phases can be differentiated during this 
period, early and late blowdown, (Lime et al., 1994). During 
early blowdown (O.O to 15 s) a fast depressurization of the 
RCS is produced. The core becomes almost completely voided 
in about 2 s. 
The rapid loss of coolant causes fue! cladding temperatures to 
increase rapidly, producing a first maximum. Subsequently, during 
late blowdown (15-35 s) the ACC setpoint is reached and start to 
discharge. During a few seconds (typically 10 s) the flow injected 
by the ACCs is bypassed towards the broken loop due to the lower 
pressure in the break location. 
• Re.fil!. After further depressurization, the steam flow has 
dropped to a sufficiently low value that it cannot longer restrict 
the ingress of ACC water through the downcomer. The water 
injected by the ACCs reaches and refills the lower plenum dur-
ing the next 15 s. At this time the fue! cladding temperatures 
continues rising. 
• Reflood. Once the lower plenum has been refilled, core reflood 
and quenching begins. The rewet produces a larger amount of 
steam which is able to cool the upper part of the core. Thus, 
the fue! temperatures reach a maximum and then start to 
decrease. The end of reflood occurs 200 s later. 
The sequences which are analysed in this paper present 
unavailability of severa! of the systems commented above, there-
fore the low-margin bounding sequences will be different in sorne 
points of the sequence evolution compared with a standard LOCA. 
5. AP1000 TRACE model nodalization and hypotheses 
The AP1000 TRACE model used through the analysis consists of 
ali the main components such as Vessel, Steam Generators, Pres-
surizer, RCPs and connecting pipes as well as the passive safety 
systems, CMTs, ACCs, ADS and PRHR. No active systems are imple-
mented in this model. The total number ofthermal hydraulic com-
ponents included in the TRACE model is 368, being 86 PIPEs, 191 
HTSTRs, 3 POWERs, 44 VALVEs, 4 PUMPs, 24 BREAKs, 10 TEEs, 3 
FILLs and 3 VESSELs, see Fig. 6. 
The reactor vessel is modeled in three-dimensional cylindrical 
coordinates, with four radial rings and 1 7 axial levels. Two TRACE 
vessels are used to model the vessel, the first vessel component 
models the lower plenum, core and upper plenum. The second ves-
sel component is used to model the downcomer with two radial 
rings, eight azimuthal sectors and 13 axial levels. The ADS is mod-
eled such as the actual design, with the first 3 stages connected 
from the top of the pressurizer to the IRWST and the fourth con-
nected to both hot legs. Safety reliefvalves and pilot operated relief 
valves are implemented in steam lines as well. The IRWST is mod-
eled with a Cartesian vessel of 4 axial levels. The model also imple-
ments severa! controls such as PZR leve! and pressure, SG leve! and 
safeguards signals (e. g. reactor trip, safety injection and RCP trip). 
In addition, 119 TRIPS, 377 CONTROL BLOCKS and 447 SIGNAL 
VARIABLES complete the model. In Table 7, the steady-state values 
achieved with TRACE are compared with the steady-state values of 
AP1000 plant design (Westinghouse Electric Company, 2008). In 
addition main conservative hypotheses considered in the model 
are listed in Table 8. 
This model has been previously applied in different LOCA anal-
ysis including the assessment of deterministic safety analysis far 
SBLOCA, MBLOCA and also LBLOCA sequences, see (Montero-
Mayorga et al., 2015, 2014; Quera! et al., 2015; Quera! and 
Montero-Mayorga, 2016). 
6. Analyses of AP1000 low-margin bounding sequences based 
on best-estimate calculations 
As described in the previous section, once the low-margin 
bounding sequences (BS-k) have been identified, OSA methodolo-
Table 7 
Steady-state values for APtoOO TRACE-model. 
Variable 
Thermal power (MWt) 
PZR pressure (bar) 
Vessel inlet temperature (K) 
Vessel outlet temperature (K) 
Vessel Flow mass flow rate (kg/s) 
SG pressure (bar) 
Feed Water temperature (K) 
Feed Water mass flow rate (kg/s) 
Table 8 
TRACE BE 
3415.0 
155.8 
552.4 
595.9 
14373.6 
55.4 
499.72 
1912.0 
Plant design 
3415.0 
155.1 
553.7 
594.1 
15100.0 
57.6 
499.85 
1885.0 
Main conservative hypotheses implemented in the APtoOO TRACE model. 
Nominal core power 102% 
Decay Heat ANS-1971 +20% 
ACC pressure set-point 49 bar 
IRWST, ACC and CMT temperature 321.8 K 
Main feed water valves closing Between 2 and 7 second after S signa! 
time 
SG isolation 6 second after reactor trip 
SG Safety valves setpoint 85.14 bar 
Safety injection Friction factors increased in discharge 
lines 
gies are used to evaluate these sequences in arder to demonstrate 
that T/H uncertainties are bounded. As shown in Table 4, five short-
term bounding sequences and two long-term bounding sequences 
were determined (Westinghouse Electric Company, 2003a). The 
results obtained by WEC (last column of Table 4) shows that only 
four low margin bounding sequences present core uncovery but 
they do not exceed Peak Cladding Temperature (PCT) acceptance 
criterion in any case (PCT < 1477 K). 
The UPM group has verified ali the short-term BS-k sequences 
with the best-estimate TRACE code applying a SSG-2 option 2 
methodology in arder to verify the results obtained by WEC which 
applied SSG-2 option 1 and option 3 methodology with NOTRUMP/ 
LOCTA and WCOBRA/TRAC codes respectively. As mentioned previ-
ously, the considered AP1000 TRACE model implements sorne con-
servatisms from DCD chapter 15, Table 8. The bounding sequences 
that are simulated and analysed are: 
• BS-A. Hot leg break (3 in.) 
• BS-B. Double-ended guillotine break (DEGB) in CMT balance 
line ( 6.8 in.) 
< T-H'.¡··.;o;> 
Fig. 6. APtoOO TRACE model in SNAP nodalization. 
• BS-C. DEGB in DVI line (2 x 4 in.) 
• BS-D. DEGB in cold leg (2 x 22 in.) 
• BS-E. Spurious ADS-4 actuation ( 4 x 11 in.) 
Ali of these BS-k sequences have core uncovery according to 
MAAP simulations, and ali of them (except of BS-E) require ADS-
4 actuation, IRWST injection and recirculation. On the other hand, 
ali the LMi sequences include ADS-2/3 actuation but none of the 
BS-k sequences include this ADS actuation. 
As it is stated in the PRA analysis, in the medium LOCA 
sequences where both CMTs fail to inject (BS-A, BS-B), automatic 
actuation of PRHR is required to provide adequate time far the 
operators to actuate the ADS-4 manually (Westinghouse Electric 
Company, 2003a). Ali the BS-k sequences with manual ADS-4 actu-
ation (BS-A, BS-B) perfarm this human action at 20 min after the S 
signa! which corresponds to its available time (Westinghouse 
Electric Company, 2003b ). 
It must be remarked that NOTRUMP simulations (BS-A, BS-B 
and BS-C) include a conservative RCP trip delay (S signa!+ 16 s, 
see (Westinghouse Electric Company, 2003a) instead of the BE 
value included in TRACE model (S signa!+ 6 s, see Westinghouse 
Electric Company, 2008 chapter 15 ). 
6.1. Hot leg break. Low-margín boundíng sequence A (BS-A) 
BS-A sequence, presents the fallowing safety systems availabil-
ity far the accident mitigation: no CMTs, no ADS-1 /2/3, credit far 4 
out of 4 ADS-4 valves, 1 out of 2 ACCs, 1 out of 2 IRWST injection 
lines and PRHR actuation, Fig. 7. 
The break size of this sequence (3 in.) was selected because the 
ACC injection occurs at the time the operators actuate the ADS-4 
manually (Westinghouse Electric Company, 2003a). Since in this 
sequence the CMTs fail, the RCS pressure remains above ACC pres-
sure injection until the operator actuate the ADS. That results in a 
period of 20 min in which no water is refilling the RCS. Thus, core 
uncovery can be reached until ACC injection. 
The TRACE results are plotted comparing with those obtained 
with NOTRUMP by WEC (Westinghouse Electric Company, 
2003a) and the chronology ofthe sequence is presented in Table 9. 
ADS-1,2,3 A PZR 
-
JRWST 1 
The results obtained with TRACE show a good agreement with the 
NOTRUMP ones. As it is depicted in Fig. 8, the pressure decreases 
until 75 bar where stabilizes far a period of about 500 s. Then, 
the pressure decreases linearly down to the manual actuation of 
ADS-4 is perfarmed (1200 s after S signa!) (Westinghouse Electric 
Company, 2003a). This ADS-4 actuation allows the ACC discharge, 
Fig. 9. Subsequently and dueto reaching nearly atmospheric condi-
tions, the IRWST starts to discharge water into the RCS, Fig. 9. It is 
appreciable that the TRACE IRWST mass flow is higher than the 
NOTRUMP one, probably due to a more conservative model in 
NOTRUMP (e.g. larger friction values). Previous SBLOCA (2 in.) 
analysis showed a similar IRWST mass flow discrepancy between 
both codes, see (Montero-Mayorga et al., 2015). However, in other 
LOCA cases with higher break sizes a similar IRWST mass flow was 
observed far TRACE and NOTRUMP simulations, see (Montero-
Mayorga et al., 2015). 
In both simulations, the mínimum predicted RCS inventory is 
quite similar, Fig. 10. However, after 1500 s the RCS inventory pre-
sents sorne differences dueto the greater makeup from the IRWST 
in TRACE. It must be noted, that in the NOTRUMP case a small core 
uncovery can be appreciated near to the ADS actuation 
(PCT = 670 K), see Westinghouse Electric Company, 2003a and 
Fig. 11. However, such behavior is not predicted with TRACE, prob-
ably due to the greater RCS inventory until the ADS is manually 
actuated, Figs. 11 and 12. 
6.2. DEGB in CMT balance líne. Low-margín boundíng sequence B (BS-
B) 
BS-B sequence presents the fallowing safety systems availabil-
ity far the accident mitigation: no CMTs, no ADS-1 /2/3, credit far 
4 out of 4 ADS-4 valves, 2 out of 2 ACCs, 1 out of 2 IRWST injection 
lines and PRHR actuation, Fig. 13. 
The TRACE results are plotted comparing with those obtained 
with NOTRUMP by WEC (Westinghouse Electric Company, 
2003a) and the chronology ofthe sequence is presented in Table 10. 
The results obtained with TRACE shows a good agreement with the 
NOTRUMP ones. 
ACC-A CMT-A 
-
1 
UNA V AJLABLE SYSTEM 
ACC-B CMT-B 
X 
Fig. 7. Hot Leg LOCA (BS-A). Availability of safety systems. 
Table 9 
Hot Leg LOCA (BS-A). Sequence chronology. 
Event 
Break occurs 
Reactor trip 
S signa! 
RCP trip 
ACC injection starts 
Manual ADS-4 actuation 
IRWST injection 
TRACE (s) 
O.O 
27.0 
35.0 
41.0 
1200.0 
1235.0 
1283.0 
NOTRUMP (s) 
O.O 
39.0 
47.0 
63.0 
1200.0 
1247.0 
1500.0 
The results of both codes show that the CMT line break (6.8 in.) 
results in a rapid RCS depressurization and ACCs injection, Figs. 14 
and 15. Once the ACCs are empty there is no more injection 
capability until the IRWST injects, and then it is necessary to actu-
ate manually the ADS-4 in arder to depressurize the RCS until 
13c+07 
le+07 
..._ ______ , 
:ie+06 
500 
atmospheric conditions befare the ACCs are empty (about 1200 s 
after S signa!) (Westinghouse Electric Company, 2003a). This 
human action allows maintaining the core covered and therefare 
high PCT values are not reached, Figs. 16-18. 
6.3. DEGB in DVI líne. Low-margín boundíng sequence C (BS-C) 
BS-C sequence presents the fallowing safety systems availabil-
ity: 1 out of 2 CMT (intact loop), O out of 2 ACC, ADS-1 /2/3 failed, 
credit far automatic actuation of 3 out of 4 ADS-4 valves and the 
IRWST corresponding to the intact line, see Fig. 19. The size of 
the DVI line is 6.8 in. but the inlet nozzle (vessel side) presents a 
4-inch flow restrictor which limits the effective break size and 
hence the maximum flow that can be discharged through the 
break. It must be remarked that this bounding sequence is quite 
important since it bounds the low-margin sequence with largest 
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Fig. 8. RCS pressure (Hot Leg LOCA, BS-A) . 
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Fig. 9. ACC and IRWST injection (Hot Leg LOCA, BS-A). 
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contribution to potential CDF and LRF (LM1) but also LM7, LM9 and 
LM11 sequences, see Table 4. 
TRACE results are plotted comparing with those obtained by 
WEC with NOTRUMP code (Westinghouse Electric Company, 
2003a) and the chronology of the sequence is presented in Table 11. 
As it is depicted in Fig. 20 and Fig. 22, the pressure and RCS inven-
tory transient presents a similar trend in both cases and the auto-
matic actuation of ADS-4 is achieved clase to 1550s far WEC and 
UPM simulations. 
300'--~~~~--'-~~~~~'--~~~~--'-~~~~----' 
In this sequence the available CMT is the only way to cool the 
core until the ADS-4 actuation allows the injection of the IRWST. 
Although the CMT flow predicted by TRACE is slightly greater, 
Fig. 21, the trend is quite similar far both codes. The time in which 
the ADS-4 actuates (CMT leve!= 20%) is appreciable in both cases 
since the CMT mass flow rate is increased, Fig. 21, and the RCS 
pressure drops simultaneously, Fig. 20. o 500 1000 
Time (s) 
Fig. 12. PCT (Hot Leg LOCA, BS-A). 
1500 2000 
Later, when the IRWST injection is achieved, the RCS is again 
pressurized above the IRWST injection pressure, which produces 
ACC-A CMT-A 
-ADS-1,2,3 A i'ZR 
-
¡ IRWST r X UNAYAILABLESYSTEM ACC-B CMT-B 
Fig. 13. DEGB in CMT balance line (BS-B). Availability of safety systems. 
Table to 
DEGB in CMT balance line (BS-B). Sequence chronology. 
Event 
Break occurs 
Reactor trip 
S signa! 
RCP trip 
ACCs injection starts 
Manual ADS-4 actuation 
IRWST injection 
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TRACE (s) 
O.O 
10.0 
12.0 
18.0 
233.0 
1212.0 
1388.0 
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-----------
500 1000 
Time (s) 
NOTRUMP (s) 
O.O 
10.7 
16.7 
32.7 
290.0 
1217.0 
1450.0 
-UPM 
- - Westinghouse 
1500 2000 
Fig. 14. RCS pressure (DEGB in CMT balance line, BS-B). 
a short interruption in the IRWST mass flow rate, Fig. 21. The mín-
imum core leve! is reached at about 1900s producing a fast PCT 
rise. When the water from the IRWST flows into the system, the 
core leve! is recovered and the temperatures decrease. It is appre-
ciable that the PCT value obtained with NOTRUMP (1127 K), 
Table 4, is higher than the obtained with TRACE code (871 K), 
Fig. 23 and Fig. 24. This is an expected result since NOTRUMP 
analysis includes more conservative models and assumptions than 
TRACE. 
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Fig. 17. Core liquid volume fraction (DEGB in CMT balance line, BS-B). 
6.3.1. Sensítívíty to CMT avaílabílíty 
In this section a modified BS-C sequence which considers 2 out 
of 2 CMTs instead of 1 out of 2 CMTs is analysed. The previous anal-
ysis of BS-C as sumes the hypothesis that the CMT connected to the 
broken DVI is not available. However, it must be reminded that the 
discharge of the CMT demands the actuation of ADS-1 at 67% CMT 
leve! and subsequently the ADS-4 at 20% CMT leve!. Therefore, if 
the CMT located in the broken loop is available, it could discharge 
its entire inventory in a short time, demanding the automatic actu-
ation of ADS-4 and producing a large break in the hot legs (ADS-4 
val ves) along with the break of one of the DVI lines. Moreover such 
sequen ce is more likely than a sequen ce in which one of the CMTs 
is not available. 
Although this modified sequence is not considered as low-
margin bounding sequence, the UPM group decided to perform this 
sensitivity analysis in arder to check that no worse consequences 
would be expected in this case. As commented beforehand, the 
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Fig. 18. PCT (DEGB in CMT balance line, BS-B). 
Table 11 
DVILB (BS-C). Sequence chronology. 
Event 
Break occurs 
Reactor trip 
S signa! 
RCP trip 
CMT injection starts 
Auto ADS-4 
IRWST injection 
Maximum PCT 
TRACE (s) 
O.O 
24.3 
27.2 
33.2 
39.2 
1355.0 
1870.3 
1995.1 
2000 
NOTRUMP (s) 
O.O 
13.4 
20.0 
36.0 
N/A 
1380.0 
1960.0 
;oo2200.0 
CMT in the broken line discharges very quickly, Fig. 25, demanding 
ADS-4 actuation befare in the case where the CMT is available, 
Fig. 26. Thus, a faster depressurization transient is appreciated, 
Fig. 27. 
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Fig. 19. DVILB (BS-C). Availability of safety systems. 
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Fig. 22. RCS Inventory (DVILB, BS-C). 
However, contrary to the behavior that could be expected due 
to the faster depressurization, the IRWST injection does not inject 
earlier. Such fact is due to the injection provided by the CMT. This 
system is driven by the steam produced in the cold legs which 
pushes the water contained in CMTs and until this system is not 
empty, the IRWST cannot inject properly in both cases. 
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Fig. 24. PCT (DVILB, BS-C). 
soo~---.--.---.------,---.---,--.---,--.--, 
600 
200 
- lCMT available (Case C)-CMT-B 
·-· 2CMT available-CMT-B 
......, 2CMT available-CMT-A 
Time (s) 
Fig. 25. CMTs mass flow (BS-C). Sensitivity to CMT availability. 
Nevertheless, an appreciable difference between both cases is 
observed. When the IRWST is able to inject in BS-C, the RCS pres-
surizes above IRWST injection pressure during a short period pro-
ducing a short cut off in IRWST injection and therefore a rise in PCT, 
Figs. 28 and 29. This behavior is not predicted in the modified 
sequence because when the IRWST starts to inject, the RCS is not 
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Fig. 28. IRWST injection (BS-C). Sensitivity to CMT availability. 
pressurized as in BS-C and therefore the IRWST injection remain 
providing water in a suitable way. 
Concerning to the core leve!, dueto the earlier depressurization 
produced in the modified BS-C sequence because of ADS demand, 
the core leve! reaches a mínimum clase to 20% and stabilizes after-
wards at 40%, Fig. 30. In BS-C, the core leve! decreases quickly 
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Fig. 30. Core Leve! (BS-C). Sensitivity to CMT availability. 
Table 12 
Sensitivity to CMT availability. Main events. 
Event 
ADS actuation (s) 
CMT empties (s) 
IRWST injection starts ( s) 
Minimum core leve! during blowdown (%) 
Maximum PCT (K) 
Table 13 
BS-C 
1 out of2 CMT 
1355.0 
1620.0 
1870.0 
55.0 
871 
Large Break LOCA (BS-D). 
chronology (TRACE code ). 
Sequence 
Event Time (s) 
Break occurs O.O 
S signa! 4.0 
CMT injection starts 5.0 
RCP trip to.O 
CMT injection paused 14.0 
ACC injection starts 14.0 
PCT occurs 50.0 
CMT injection resumed 250.0 
IRWST injection 1210.0 
Modified BS-C 
2 out of2 CMT 
300.0 
1550.0 
1860.0 
25.0 
726 
when the ADS-4 is automatically actuated at 1200 s, then the core 
leve! is similar in both cases and stabilizes at 50% providing long 
term cooling. Table 12 collects main events of both sequences. 
These sensitivity analysis results, Table 12, allow to confirm 
that BS-C is actually more limiting than the proposed modified 
BS-C sequence. 
6.4. DEGB in cold leg. Low-margín boundíng sequence D (BS-D) 
BS-D sequence presents the fallowing safety systems availabil-
ity: 2 out of CMTs, 2 out of 2 ACCs and 1 out of 2 IRWST injection 
lines. This sequence, DEGB in cold leg, is analysed in the AP1000 
DCD chapter 15 by means of the best-estimate plus uncertainty 
ASTRUM methodology with WCOBRA/TRAC code, which corre-
sponds to a SSG-2 option 3 methodology, see (Westinghouse 
Electric Company, 2008; US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
2007) far more details. The differences between DCD LBLOCA 
best-estimate case and BS-D are, see (Westinghouse Electric 
Company, 2003b) section 15.0.12.3 and (Westinghouse Electric 
Company, 2003a), 
• Offsite power is available until the RCPs are tripped in BS-D, but 
DCD case includes loss of offsite power at the time of the break 
and then RCPs are also tripped at the time of the break. 
• DCD LBLOCA single failure hypothesis: One CMT valve fails to 
open. However, BS-D configuration includes 2 out of 2 CMTs 
available. 
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Fig. 31. RCS pressure (DEGB in cold leg, BS-D). 
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Fig. 32. Core Leve! (DEGB in cold leg, BS-D). 
• The containment isolation is failed in BS-D, so that the contain-
ment is at atmospheric pressure. 
The UPM group has simulated this sequence based on the same 
methodology and conservative hypotheses used far the other 
bounding sequences (SSG-2 option 2). 
TRACE results are plotted comparing with those obtained by 
WEC with WCOBRA/TRAC code and the chronology of the TRACE 
sequence is presented in Table 13 (WCOBRA/TRAC chronology is 
not available in open literature). As it can be seen in Figs. 31-34, 
the predicted behavior is quite similar far both codes. One of the 
differences that can be appreciated corresponds to core leve! stabi-
lization when such leve! is recovered, Fig. 32, which remains lower 
in the case of UPM. This fact produces the need of 100 s more to 
achieve successful core cooling in the hottest rod, Fig. 33. In both 
cases, the PCTs are far away from the acceptance criterion. WEC 
predicted far BS-D a best-estimate PCT value of 1159 K and then 
estimated the 95th percentile by adding the difference between: 
• DCD LBLOCA analysis best-estimate reference case (1308 K) 
• DCD LBLOCA result with uncertainty (1435 K). 
Such difference (1435-1308 = 127 K) is added to BS-D best-
estimate value to estímate the 95th percentile, 1286 K 
(Westinghouse Electric Company, 2003a). It must be noted that 
the maximum value far 95th percentile PCT in WEC case 
(1286 K) is slightly greater than the value obtained by UPM 
(1234 K). 
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Fig. 34. Passive safety systems injection (DEGB in cold leg, BS-D). Extended view. 
6.5. Spuríous ADS-4 actuatíon. Low-margín boundíng sequence E (BS-
E) 
BS-E sequence presents the fallowing safety systems availabil-
ity: 1 out of 2 CMTs, no ADS-1 /2/3, 1 out of 2 ACCs, IRWST injection 
and PRHR actuation, Fig. 35. This case was analysed by WEC with 
the best-estimate WCOBRA/TRAC computer code (Zhang et al., 
1998) and considering similar hypotheses and methodology as 
the ones far BS-D. 
TRACE results are plotted comparing with those obtained by 
WEC with WCOBRA/TRAC code and the chronology of the TRACE 
sequence is presented in Table 14. Regarding the comparison of 
results between both codes, a very similar trend is obtained far 
the main variables. The pressure reaches the ACC pressure injec-
tion almost at the same time in both simulations, Fig. 36, although 
the discharge ends slightly later in case of WCOBRA/TRAC, Fig. 37. 
As it can be appreciated in Fig. 38, after ACC injection the core leve! 
is recovered and is maintained with the actuation of CMT and 
IRWST, Fig. 40. Finally, the PCT obtained in both analysis is quite 
similar, Fig. 39. It must be noted that, in the same way of BS-D 
sequence, WEC predicted far BS-E a best-estimate PCT value of 
718 K and then the estimated 95th percentile by adding the previ-
ous difference obtained far BS-D. Such difference (127 K) is added 
to the best-estimate BS-E value obtaining the mentioned 845 K 
(Westinghouse Electric Company, 2003a). This 95% percentile 
PCT value is greater than PCT value obtained with TRACE (701 K). 
6.6. Maín results obtaíned in low-margín boundíng sequences analysís 
wíth TRACE 
The PCT obtained in short-term low-margin bounding 
sequences with TRACE using SSG-2 option 2 along with the ones 
far WEC using SSG-2 options 1 and 3 are collected in Table 15. 
The comparison allows verifying the results predicted by WEC by 
using different T/H codes, NOTRUMP (N) and WCOBRA/TRAC 
(WC/T). In general the PCT predicted with TRACE when there is 
1.Se+07 
g le+07 
~ 
~ 
Se+OG 
Table 14 
Spurious ADS-4 actuation (BS-E). 
Sequence chronology (TRACE code ). 
Event 
ADS-4 valves open 
Reactor trip 
S signa! 
RCP trip 
CMT injection starts 
ACC injection starts 
Maximum PCT 
IRWST injection starts 
Time (s) 
O.O 
6.5 
8.0 
14.0 
19.0 
41.0 
91.0 
470.0 
- UPM 
- - Westinghouse 
100 200 300 
Time (s) 
400 500 
Fig. 36. RCS pressure (Spurious ADS-4 actuation, BS-E). 
600 
core uncovery is very similar to WEC results with exception of 
BS-C. Moreover no core uncovery is obtained with TRACE far BS-
A and BS-B. It must be noted, that ali these BS-k sequences where 
core uncovery sequences when they were simulated with MAAP. 
This result also indicates that the use of MAAP seems to be 
adequate far AP1000 PRA Leve! 1. 
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Fig. 35. Spurious ADS-4 actuation (BS-E). Availability of safety systems. 
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7. Conclusions 
500 600 
This paper summarizes and verifies, the low-margin sequences 
evaluation process developed by WEC in arder to bound the T/H 
uncertainties that can affect to the PRA success criteria. Moreover, 
this study has verified with the best-estimate TRACE computer 
code, by means of SSG-2 option 2, the low-margin bounding 
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Fig. 40. CMT and IRWST mass flow (Spurious ADS-4 actuation, BS-E). 
Table 15 
Main results obtained far PCT in BS-k sequences. Comparison with WEC results. 
Initiating event 
Hot leg break (BS-A) 
DEGB in CMT balance line (BS-B) 
DEGB in DVI line (BS-C) 
DEGB in cold leg (BS-D) 
Spurious ADS-4 actuation (BS-E) 
TRACE (K) 
No core uncovery 
No core uncovery 
871 
1234 
701 
WEC(K) 
670 (N) 
No core uncovery (N) 
1127 (N) 
1286 (WC/T) 
845 (WC/T) 
sequences identified and evaluated by WEC using NOTRUMP (BS-
A, BS-B and BS-C) and WCOBRA/ TRAC (BS-0 and BS-E). 
The results show a similar trend between TRACE-NOTRUMP and 
TRACE-WCOBRA/TRAC. However, sorne differences are observed in 
the discharge of IRWST far small break sizes (3 in. hot leg break) in 
which NOTRUMP presents mass flow rate values which are almost 
a half of the predicted by TRACE. Such behavior was al so observed 
in Friend et al. (1997) where this issue was analyzed in deep and 
the main reason far this behavior is the sensitivity of IRWST capac-
ity to inject clase to atmospheric conditions. Regarding the 
sequences in which core uncovery is faund, the analysis show that 
a lower PCT value is always obtained in TRACE simulations with 
SSG-2 option 2. Nonetheless, ali of them remain well below from 
the PCT acceptance criterion (1477 K). 
As a global conclusion, this analysis has allowed to verify the 
AP1000 T/H uncertainty evaluation process perfarmed by WEC 
far the most risk-important low-margin sequences with a best-
estimate code such as TRACE applying SSG-2 option 2 approach. 
This work has allowed enlarging the set of OSA and PRA verifi-
cations related with different AP1000 sequences by means of 
TRACE code in the framework of the ISAMAR project. New PRA 
and OSA verification analyses will be perfarmed in future works. 
Disclaimer 
This paper is the result of the analysis carried out by the 
research group of the Technical University of Madrid and therefare 
Westinghouse Electric Company and the USNRC were not involved 
in such investigations and they are not responsible about the con-
tents here exposed. 
AP1000 is a trademark or registered trademark in the United 
States of Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, its subsidiaries 
and/or its affiliates. This mark may also be used and/or registered 
in other countries throughout the world. Ali rights reserved. Unau-
thorized use is strictly prohibited. Other names may be trademarks 
of their respective owners. 
Acknowledgements 
This work has been funded by the Spanish Ministry of Compet-
itiveness and Economy within ISAMAR project: ENE2011-28256. 
Its support is gratefully acknowledged. The authors would also like 
to thanks to Westinghouse Electric Company and to USNRC far the 
technical support. 
References 
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards subcommittees on Reliability and 
probabilistic Risk Assessment. Official Transcript of proceedings ACRST-3228. 
NRC. 23, january 2003. 
Friend, M.T .. Wright, R.F., Hunda!, R., Hochreiter, LE., Ogrins, M., 1997. AP600 
response to small break loss of coolant accident events: Analysis of SPES-2 
integral test results. Nucl. Technol. 122, 19-42. 
Hochreiter, LE., et al. WCOBRA/TRAC Applicability to AP600 Large-Break Loss-of-
Coolant Accident, WCAP-14171, Revision 2 (Proprietary) and WCAP-14172, 
Revision 2 (Non proprietary), March 1998. 
IAEA, 2009. IAEA Specific Safety Standards far protecting people and the 
environment, Deterministic Safety Analysis far Nuclear Power Plants, Specific 
Safety Cuide No. SSG-2. 
Lafi, A.Y., Reyes, j.N. Two-inch Cold Leg Break Tests in APEX and ROSA/AP600-
Comparative Study. In: 9th International Topical Meeting on Nuclear Reactor 
Thermal Hydraulics (NURETH-9). California, San Francisco, 1999. 
Lime, F.j., Boya el<, B.E., Updated TRAC Analysis of an AP600 Design. Technical Report 
LA-UR-94-121, Los Alamas National Laboratory, February 1994. 
MAAP4, Modular Accident Analysis program far LWR Power plants. Computer Code 
User's Manual. Electric Power Research institute, 1994. 
Meyer, P.E .. "NOTRUMP - A Nodal Transient Small-Break and General Network 
Code", WCAP-10079-P-A (Proprietary) and WCAP-10080-A (Non proprietary), 
August 1985. 
Montero-Mayorga,].. Quera!, C., Gonzalez-Cadelo].. 2014. Analysis and Verification 
of Direct Vessel Injection Line Break event tree far APlOOO® reactor with TRACE 
code. Nuclear España, no 356. 
Montero-Mayorga, ].. Quera!, C., Gonzalez-Cadelo ].. 2015. AP1000 SBLOCA 
simulations with TRACE code. Annals of Nuclear Energy, Volume 75, january 
2015, pp. 87-100. 
Ohkawa et al. "AP600 PRA Thermal/Hydraulic Uncertainty Evaluation far Passive 
Systems Reliability". WCAP-14800-NP. Westinghouse Electric Company. june 
1997. 
Quera!, c .. Montero-Mayorga,].. 2016. Risk reduction dueto modification of normal 
residual heat removal system of APlOOO® reactor to meet European Utility 
Requirements, Annals of Nuclear Energy, Volume 91, May 2016, pp. 65-78. 
Quera!, C., Montero-Mayorga, ].. Gonzalez-Cadelo, ].. jiménez, G. 2015. AP1000 
Large-Break LOCA BEPU analysis with TRACE code. Annals of Nuclear Energy, 
Volume 85, November 2015, pp. 576-589. 
Selim Sancaktar and Terry Schulz. Risk Informing PRA Success Criteria. In: 
Application to the AP1000 Proceedings of ICAPP '04 Pittsburgh, PA, USA, june 
13-17, 2004 Paper 4239. 
Shimeck D.j., Hartz j.J. Description of the Westinghouse LOCTAJR 1-D Heat 
Conduction Code far LOCA Analysis of Fue! Rods. WCAP-15578 (Non 
proprietary), September 2000. 
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. TRAC-RELAP Advanced Computational Engine 
(TRACE) User's Manual Input Specification. 2007. 
Westinghouse Electric Company. "AP1000 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Report. 
Chapter 59 Appendix A. Thermal Hydraulic analysis to Support Success 
Criteria". AAN: ML030510639. 2003a. 
Westinghouse Electric Company. MAAP4/NOTRUMP Benchmarking to Support The 
Use of MAAP4 far AP600 Success Criteria Analysis, WCAP-14869, 1997. 
Westinghouse Electric Company. AP1000 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Report. 
2003b. 
Westinghouse Electric Company. AP1000 Design Control Document. Revl 9. 2008. 
Wright, R.F., 2007. Simulated AP1000 response to design basis small-break LOCA 
events in APEX-1000 test facility. Nucl. Eng. Technol. 39, 287-298. 
Zhang,J.. Bajorek, S.M .. Kemper, R.M., Nissley, M.E .. Petkov, N., Hochreiter, LE., 1998. 
Application of the WCOBRA/TRAC best-estimate methodology to the AP600 
large-break LOCA analysis. Nucl. Eng. Des. 186, 279-301. 
